Abstract:
Queueing management for the processor-sharing (PS) queue has been applied to the telecommunication and internet systems, so will be to the software-as-a-service (SaaS) business. As the pioneer queueing management paper by Naor in 1969 is for first-come-first-serve (FCFS) queues, we introduce its extension in this talk not only from FCFS to PS, but also from single-class to multiple-class queues. Consider an observable PS queue with an utility function of the reward of receiving service and the cost of waiting in system. We study the decision of to queue or not to queue from both the customer’s (self) and the system administrator’s (social) points of view, and obtain conditions of existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium strategy. These strategies are shown to be different with an economical explanation. We also discuss methods to induce the self-optimal decision approaching the social-optimal decision.
Queueing management for the processor-sharing (PS) queue has been applied to the telecommunication and internet systems, so will be to the software-as-a-service (SaaS) business. As the pioneer queueing management paper by Naor in 1969 is for first-come-first-serve (FCFS) queues, we introduce its extension in this talk not only from FCFS to PS, but also from single-class to multiple-class queues. Consider an observable PS queue with an utility function of the reward of receiving service and the cost of waiting in system. We study the decision of to queue or not to queue from both the customer’s (self) and the system administrator’s (social) points of view, and obtain conditions of existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium strategy. These strategies are shown to be different with an economical explanation. We also discuss methods to induce the self-optimal decision approaching the social-optimal decision.